Man-Men to Social Group to Civil Society

The conceptual movement from “man” to “men,” then to “group,” and ultimately to “civil society,” represents a foundational trajectory in social and political theory, capturing the evolution of human association from isolated individuality to complex, structured forms of collective life. At its starting point, “man” signifies the abstract individual—often conceived in philosophical traditions as a solitary, rational, and self-contained being.

 (The journey from the state of abstract individual to real individual)

The theoretical movement from the “abstract individual” to the “real individual” is one of the most profound themes in social and political philosophy. It marks a shift from viewing the human being as an isolated, self-sufficient entity to understanding the individual as socially embedded, historically conditioned, and relationally constituted. This journey is not merely descriptive but deeply philosophical, involving epistemological, ontological, and normative transformations.

The “abstract individual” is primarily a construct of early modern political theory. Thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau begin their analyses with a hypothetical “state of nature,” where the individual is imagined as existing prior to society. In this condition, the individual is endowed with certain natural attributes—reason, self-interest, and rights. However, this individual is “abstract” because it is stripped of all social, cultural, economic, and historical determinations. It is a methodological fiction, designed to explain the origin of political authority and social order.

The abstraction lies in the fact that such an individual is conceived as self-contained and pre-social. The social world appears as something external, something that is entered into through contract or agreement. This leads to a conception of society as an aggregate of individuals, rather than as a constitutive framework that shapes individuality itself. Liberal political theory, especially in its classical form, retains this abstract individual as its foundational unit, emphasizing autonomy, rights, and rational choice.

The transition to the “real individual” begins with a critique of this abstraction. G. W. F. Hegel plays a crucial role here. For Hegel, the individual cannot be understood outside the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) of society. The individual becomes “real” only within a network of social institutions—family, civil society, and the state. These institutions are not external constraints but constitutive conditions of individuality. In other words, the individual’s identity, freedom, and rationality are actualized through participation in social life. Freedom is not merely the absence of interference but the presence of meaningful social relations that enable self-realization.

This line of thought is radicalized by Karl Marx. Marx criticizes the liberal notion of the abstract individual as an ideological construct of bourgeois society. In his view, the “real individual” is a concrete, sensuous, and productive being, whose existence is shaped by material conditions and social relations of production. The famous idea that “the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual” but “the ensemble of social relations” captures this shift. The individual is not prior to society; rather, society is the very condition of individuality. The so-called abstract individual of liberalism reflects the alienated condition of individuals under capitalism, where social relations appear as relations between independent, self-interested agents.

Marx’s perspective introduces a historical dimension. The “real individual” is not a fixed entity but a product of specific historical processes. Under different modes of production—feudalism, capitalism, socialism—the nature of individuality itself changes. In capitalist society, individuals appear formally free and equal but are substantively constrained by class relations and economic structures. Thus, the realization of the “real individual” requires not just philosophical recognition but material transformation.

The movement from the “abstract individual” to the “real individual” in Karl Marx is inseparable from his dialectical method, which he reworks from G. W. F. Hegel but places on a materialist foundation. For Marx, this transition is not merely a conceptual clarification; it is a historical and social process shaped by contradictions within material life. The “abstract individual” is not simply an error of thought but an ideological expression of a specific stage of social development—namely, bourgeois capitalist society.

Marx’s dialectics begins with a critique of abstraction itself. In works such as The German Ideology, he argues that philosophers have often started from “what men say, imagine, conceive,” rather than from “real, active men.” This distinction is crucial. The abstract individual is a product of thought that isolates the individual from the network of social relations in which he actually exists. By contrast, the “real individual” is a concrete, historically situated being whose life activity—labour, production, and interaction—constitutes both society and selfhood. Thus, Marx famously asserts that “the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of social relations.” This statement captures the dialectical reversal: instead of deriving society from individuals, Marx derives individuality from social relations.

The dialectical movement operates through contradiction. In capitalist society, individuals appear as independent, free, and equal agents—owners of commodities who enter into exchange relations. This is the realm of what Marx, in Capital, calls the “sphere of circulation,” where the ideology of the abstract individual finds its strongest expression. Here, individuals confront one another as juridically equal persons, each pursuing their private interests. This corresponds to the liberal image of the abstract individual, as seen in the theories of John Locke and Adam Smith.

However, Marx’s dialectical method reveals that this appearance conceals a deeper reality. When we move from the sphere of circulation to the sphere of production, the contradiction becomes evident. The worker, who appears as a free individual selling labour power, is in fact constrained by the necessity to sell that labour to survive. In the production process, the worker is subordinated to capital, and the relation between individuals becomes a relation between classes—capitalists and proletarians. Thus, the “abstract individual” of the market is negated by the “real individual” of the production process, who is embedded in exploitative social relations.

This dialectical unfolding can be seen clearly in Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism in Capital. Commodities appear as independent entities with value inherent in them, and social relations between people take the form of relations between things. Similarly, individuals appear as autonomous units, but this autonomy is illusory. The real relations—of labour, exploitation, and class—are obscured. The task of critique is to demystify this appearance and reveal the underlying social reality. In this sense, the transition from abstract to real individual is also a movement from ideology to critique.

Marx’s dialectics is also historical. The abstract individual is not a timeless fiction but a historically specific form of consciousness that arises with the development of capitalist relations. In pre-capitalist societies, individuals are more directly embedded in communal or feudal relations. It is only with the dissolution of these ties and the emergence of market society that individuals appear as independent and self-sufficient. Yet this independence is itself a form of dependence—on the market, on capital, and on impersonal social forces. Thus, the abstract individual is both a product and a mask of capitalist modernity.

Critically, Marx does not simply reject the idea of individuality. Rather, he seeks its transformation. The dialectical process does not end with the exposure of abstraction but points toward a future in which the “real individual” can be fully realized. In a communist society, as envisioned in Marx’s later writings, individuals would no longer be dominated by alien social forces. Instead, social relations would be consciously organized, allowing individuals to develop their capacities freely. This is expressed in the idea of the “free development of each” as the condition for the “free development of all.”

However, Marx’s account is not without tensions. One critical question concerns whether his emphasis on social determination risks undermining individual autonomy. If individuals are entirely constituted by social relations, can they act as agents of change? Marx responds implicitly through his concept of praxis: individuals, though shaped by circumstances, also transform those circumstances through collective action. Yet the balance between structure and agency remains a point of debate among later theorists.

Another critical issue lies in the reduction of individuality to class relations. While Marx powerfully exposes the economic foundations of social life, critics argue that he underestimates other dimensions of identity—such as culture, gender, and ethnicity—that also shape the “real individual.” Later traditions, including Western Marxism and critical theory, have attempted to address these limitations by expanding the scope of social analysis.

In sum, Marx’s dialectical explanation of the movement from abstract to real individual reveals the individual as a product of historically specific social relations, while also exposing the ideological character of abstract individualism. Through a process of critique, contradiction, and historical analysis, Marx transforms the individual from a philosophical abstraction into a concrete, dynamic, and socially embedded being. This movement is both analytical and emancipatory, aiming not only to understand the individual but to create the conditions for the realization of truly human individuality.

The transition from “man” to “men” marks the recognition of plurality. Here, individuality gives way to coexistence, where multiple individuals inhabit a shared space. This plurality introduces the conditions of interaction—cooperation, conflict, competition, and communication. Aristotle famously asserted that the human being is a “zoon politikon” (political animal), emphasizing that humans naturally live among others. The presence of “men” thus generates the necessity of norms, customs, and rudimentary forms of organization, as individuals begin to negotiate their coexistence.

From this plurality emerges the formation of “groups.” A group is not merely a collection of individuals but a structured association bound by shared interests, identities, or purposes. Groups may be based on kinship, economic activity, belief systems, or cultural practices. Theories of social contract, especially in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, highlight how collective will (general will) arises from the aggregation and transformation of individual wills within a group context. At this stage, social bonds deepen, and roles, hierarchies, and institutions begin to take shape. The group becomes a mediating layer between the individual and the larger social order, enabling both solidarity and differentiation.

The culmination of this progression is “civil society,” a complex and historically contingent sphere of social life situated between the individual and the state. Civil society encompasses a wide array of voluntary associations, institutions, and networks—such as families, markets, religious organizations, and civic bodies—that operate with a degree of autonomy from the state. In classical political economy and philosophy, G. W. F. Hegel conceptualized civil society as the realm of particular interests, where individuals pursue their private goals within a system of interdependence. For Karl Marx, however, civil society is the site of bourgeois relations, marked by class divisions and economic exploitation, reflecting the material base of capitalist society.

In contemporary discourse, civil society is often seen as a vital arena for democratic participation, social capital formation, and the articulation of collective interests. It provides a space for contestation and cooperation, enabling citizens to organize, deliberate, and influence public life beyond formal political institutions. However, it is also marked by inequalities of power and access, raising critical questions about inclusion and representation.

Thus, the movement from “man” to “men,” to “group,” and finally to “civil society,” encapsulates the deepening complexity of human association. It reflects a shift from abstract individuality to embedded social existence, from mere coexistence to organized interaction, and from simple groupings to a differentiated and institutionalized social sphere. This progression is not merely descriptive but also analytical, offering a framework to understand how human beings construct, inhabit, and transform their social worlds

Later thinkers, including Émile Durkheim and George Herbert Mead, further deepen this understanding. Durkheim shows how social facts—norms, values, and collective consciousness—shape individual behavior and identity. Mead, from a symbolic interactionist perspective, argues that the self emerges through social interaction, particularly through language and communication. The individual becomes “real” through processes of recognition, role-taking, and internalization of social expectations.

From a contemporary standpoint, the journey from abstract to real individual can be understood as a movement from methodological individualism to relational and structural conceptions of the self. The abstract individual is a necessary starting point for certain kinds of analysis, particularly in normative political theory. However, it becomes inadequate when we seek to understand the lived reality of individuals, who are always already situated within networks of power, culture, economy, and history.

Thus, the “real individual” is not an isolated atom but a socially constituted being. This realization has significant implications. It challenges the primacy of purely individualistic explanations of social phenomena, calls for a more nuanced understanding of freedom and agency, and highlights the importance of social justice in enabling individuals to actualize their potential. The journey, therefore, is not just theoretical but also emancipatory, pointing toward a vision of society in which individuals can become fully human through their social relations.

Thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, in their respective formulations of the state of nature, begin with this notion of the individual as prior to society. However, this abstraction is largely methodological, as human existence is rarely, if ever, experienced in isolation.

Gramshi: How he perceived man- to- Men, and civil-political society

Antonio Gramsci develops one of the most subtle and historically grounded accounts of the transition from “man” (the abstract individual) to “men” (social beings embedded in relations), and further into the structured domains of civil and political society. His reflections, especially in the Prison Notebooks, are deeply influenced by but also critical of Karl Marx, particularly on the question of how human beings become social and political subjects.

Gramsci begins by rejecting the idea of “man” as an isolated, self-sufficient, abstract individual. For him, such a conception is ideological, rooted in liberal individualism. “Man” in abstraction does not exist; rather, human beings are always historically situated. He famously suggests that “man is the process of his acts,” meaning that human identity is not fixed but continuously formed through practical activity (praxis), social relations, and historical conditions. Thus, the transition from “man” to “men” is not merely numerical but ontological and social. It signifies the movement from an abstract philosophical category to concrete, historically embedded individuals who exist in relation with others.

In Gramsci’s narrative, “men” are constituted through what he calls “relations of force” and “relations of production.” Individuals become “men” only within a network of social interactions—economic, cultural, and ideological. Unlike the liberal conception where society is formed by the voluntary association of pre-existing individuals, Gramsci argues that individuals themselves are products of society. This reverses the classical social contract narrative. Human beings do not first exist as isolated “men” who then form society; rather, society precedes and shapes the individual.

This leads to his crucial distinction between civil society and political society, which together form the integral state. Civil society, in Gramsci’s framework, is not merely a sphere of voluntary associations as in liberal theory, but a complex ensemble of institutions such as schools, churches, media, and cultural organizations. These institutions function as sites of ideological production and dissemination. Through them, dominant classes establish what Gramsci calls “hegemony,” that is, the capacity to secure consent from subordinate groups. In civil society, individuals are transformed into “men” who internalize norms, values, and beliefs that sustain the existing social order.

Political society, on the other hand, refers to the domain of coercive institutions—the state in the narrow sense, including government, law, police, and military. If civil society operates through consent, political society operates through coercion. However, Gramsci insists that these two spheres are not separate but deeply intertwined. Together, they constitute what he calls the “integral state,” where domination is maintained through a combination of coercion and consent.

The movement from “men” to participation in civil and political society is mediated by ideology and practice. Individuals become active participants in civil society through their engagement with cultural and ideological institutions. They become political subjects when they engage with structures of power, either by conforming to or resisting them. Gramsci places special emphasis on the role of intellectuals in this process. He distinguishes between “traditional intellectuals” and “organic intellectuals.” The latter emerge from within a class and articulate its experiences and aspirations, helping to transform a fragmented mass of individuals into a coherent social force.

Gramsci’s dialectical method is evident in how he understands this entire process. There is no linear progression from “man” to “men” to civil society to political society. Instead, these are mutually constitutive and historically dynamic processes. Civil society shapes individuals, but individuals, through praxis, can also transform civil society. Similarly, political society enforces order, but it is also reshaped through struggles that emerge within civil society.

Critically, Gramsci departs from Marx in emphasizing the relative autonomy of civil society. While Marx tended to see the state primarily as an instrument of class domination rooted in economic structures, Gramsci highlights the importance of culture, ideology, and consent. He argues that ruling classes maintain power not only through economic control or state coercion but through the active consent of the governed, secured in civil society. This makes the transformation of society a more complex and prolonged process, requiring what he calls a “war of position” rather than a direct revolutionary assault (“war of manoeuvre”).

Thus, for Gramsci, the journey from “man” to “men” and into civil-political society is a deeply historical and dialectical process. Human beings are not pre-social individuals who enter society; they are always already social, formed within networks of power, culture, and production. Civil society is the terrain where consent is organized and identities are shaped, while political society is the apparatus of coercion. Together, they form a unified structure of domination and potential transformation, within which human beings continuously make and remake themselves.

In this way, Gramsci provides a richer and more nuanced account than classical liberalism or even orthodox Marxism, showing that the formation of “men” and their participation in society is not merely economic or contractual, but profoundly cultural, ideological, and political.